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Governing Vitalities and the Security State 
Governing Vitalities 
In the lectures on Security, Territory, Population, his account of the consolidation of 
what he called the Security State, Michel Foucault emphasized the ways that a new 
articulation of biopolitics and governmentality altered the relations between 
population and territory (Foucault, 2007; Elden, 2007; Legg, 2005; 2011; Nally, 
2011).1 Indeed, for Foucault these new relations were in part constitutive of modern 
notions of state and people, such that, and again in part, a state effect is something 
produced by the strategies of biopolitics and governmentality. As always with 
Foucault, a historical argument was made for a political purpose. In order to attend to 
something contingent in the present, Foucault characteristically illustrated the 
conditions of its emergence, an intellectual strategy described by Mitchell Dean as 
making critical and effective histories (Dean, 1994; Kearns, 2007). In broad terms, 
Foucault highlighted a shift from territory to population, from sovereignty to security, 
as a focus for the arts of government. For Foucault, the monarch’s concern with 
sovereignty in the earlier period, variously located as ending some time between the 
mid-seventeenth and late-eighteenth centuries, emphasized the regulation of territorial 
boundaries. In the security state that followed, the imperatives of economic 
circulation breached the walls of sovereignty and the arts of government now attended 
more to the capacities of the state, regulating population and other resources. The 
political issue that arises from this, exemplified for Foucault in various ways by 
                                                 
1 I want to thank Chris Philo both for the title and for the provocation of an invitation 
to contribute to the plenary sessions on “Geographies of Insecurity” at the RGS/IBG 
Conference in Edinburgh, July 2012. 
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Sweden and Germany, was about regulating individuals to give collective security 
against threats to the productivity, or force, of the body politic. 
In this essay, I want to take up the geographical and vital themes of this set of 
lectures and assess both the nature of the break posited by Foucault and the political 
purchase afforded by this view of the distinctiveness of the present. My strategy is to 
reverse Foucault’s emphasis and look for aspects of the regulation of life in the earlier 
period and to aspects of the regulation of territory in the later one. This is not because 
I think Foucault ignores vitality in his first period or ignores territoriality in his 
second, but, rather, that the integration of the two themes, rather than the 
predominance of one over the other, shows the importance in both periods of a set of 
relations about which Foucault has rather little to say altogether. My conclusion is 
that, in both periods, life and space are woven together in ways that are distinctly 
geopolitical and, furthermore, that this dimension of the spatiality of vital security 
gives us important purchase upon our moment of present danger. Although Foucault 
saw the Socialist focus upon the state as obscuring the nature of government, his own 
treatment of the arts of government took states as objects in isolation, and indeed very 
often took France as paradigm, thus occluding the significance of geopolitics and 
geography. Yet without this international dimension, the modern appeal to security is 
but poorly understood, and the over-determining relations between capital and 
imperialism practically invisible. 
 I address Foucault’s analysis by asking, first, how vitality was taken up as an 
issue by government in the period of sovereignty, the period before Foucault finds 
population to be a focus of the state. A qualified right to life was emergent in the 
government responsibilities of the modern states system. Although intended primarily 
to counter threats to public disorder (Walter and Schofield, 1989) and later to secure 
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the manpower necessary for a strong economy and an effective army (Boyle, 2006; 
Elbe, 2006), the reasons of state included the securing of life against the threat of 
famine or epidemic. These relations of vitality with security although somewhat 
obvious have not received the geographical attention that they deserve (Kearns and 
Reid-Henry, 2009). These concerns animated spatial practices that are at the heart of 
the geopolitics of the states system, as may be illustrated from the famine and 
epidemic practices of early modern European states.  
I find vitality, then, ever implicated in a logic of territoriality that is not only 
about defending borders but is also about negotiating international relations, a logic 
that is inherently geopolitical and which continues into the period that Foucault 
identifies as dominated by the security state. In work on the relations between 
biopolitics and geopolitics, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) caution against 
conflating the two, insisting upon “two great problematisations of security” (page 
274), the one concerned with “foreign territoriality” (page 275) and the other with 
life. Moreover, they propose that “[t]hese two security analytics do not inhabit the 
same plane of analysis” (page 275). Yet having insisted upon this conceptual 
distinction they immediately note a mutual dependence, suggesting that geopolitics 
and biopolitics “coexist and continue to correlate” (page 275). They question 
Foucault’s characteristic separation of the macro from the micro, “because the 
problematisation of security provides such a powerful point of intersection between 
geopolitical and biopolitical security analysis” (page 276). I find vitality ever 
implicated in a logic of territoriality that is not only about defending borders but is 
also about negotiating international relations, a logic that is inherently geopolitical 
and which continues into the period that Foucault identifies as dominated by the 
security state. Stuart Elden, likewise, has argued that Foucault misseds the profound 
 4 
Field Code Changed
territoriality of the arts of government in this laterfor this later period,,  following the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648). My argument is similar but, whereas Elden looks at the 
cartographic concern with the qualities of territory as a sort of estate, I am interested 
in the related issue of the territoriality of geopolitical relations, elided by Foucault for 
both the period of sovereignty and the period of the security state. This brings me to 
an evaluation of the political purchase of Foucault’s notion of the security state 
where, again, I note an important and neglected geopolitical dimension to the 
regulation of life. As Brown (2011) notes, international concern with public health is 
most readily prompted when the health of the rich is endangered by the diseases that 
the poor do not keep to themselves. But, more than this, the idea of global as opposed 
to international health is very often “‘transnational” from a US base and working with 
and for US interests’ (Bashford, 2006, page 72). Rather than producing a new security 
state, the latest reconfiguration of security and vitality may promise a revivified 
imperial geopolitics. 
Vitality and Security 
In early modern Europe, when food was short, monarchs and town corporations 
anticipated social unrest; and often got it (Tilly, 1983). Food markets were regulated 
by notions of moral economy (Thompson, 1971). Elaborate English regulations about 
the regulation of the food market date from at least  1266 with an Assize of Bread and 
Ale.2 Bread was sold in loaves of specified quality at a fixed price, for example a 
cheap loaf of inferior grain sold for a farthing and was known as a small cocket loaf. 
The assize (or group of magistrates sitting to make regulations) fixed the weight of 
                                                 
2 1 Statutes of the Realm 199-200 (1235-1377) Statutes of Uncertain Date. This 
statute was collected (1811) in the critical and official edition of the Statutes of the 
Realm and given as of uncertain date. It has often been assigned to the 51st year of 
the reign of Henry III (1266-7). I quote from the version published in 1811. 
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the bread according to the price of wheat; when prices were high, loaves were small. 
For minor offences, bakers were fined but for seriously skimping on the size of the 
low-grade loaves they were to “suffer the Judgment of the Body, that is to say, the 
Pillory.” Other measures in city charters allowed magistrates to regulate markets to 
prevent merchants cornering supply. It was illegal to force up food prices by: buying 
up grain before it reached open market (forestalling), acquiring an excessive share of 
the produce (engrossing), or repurchasing a large market share before wholesale 
became retail (regrating). These have been described as “the earliest attempts in 
English Law to regulate trade” (Herbruck, 1929, page 365).  
Grain supply would fluctuate with the harvest and in bad years the poor might 
find their loaves but one half the size of more bountiful times. Again, both city and 
national government intervened to protect the poor from the full force of nature. From 
1411 the Corporation of the City of London used Leadenhall as a public granary to 
hold grain from good years to the leaner that may follow and from “[a]t least as early 
as 1390 London tried the plan of meeting a dearth by the municipal purchase of corn” 
(Gras, 1915, page 79).  From 1597, the English government assumed the right to 
demand that in hungry years magistrates should be bound by a so-called Book of 
Orders that instructed them to seek out private stocks of grain and force delivery to 
local markets (Nielsen, 1997).  
In other words, food, which probably absorbed about half the income of the 
English labourer in the early modern period (Shammas, 1983), was a commodity that 
was heavily regulated. Food security was a matter of government policy, both local 
and national. Faced with the market, isolated individuals would not get food at a fair 
price. Harvest fluctuations and market manipulation held lives to ransom and 
individuals required protecting. The state needed to act because individuals were 
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unable to defend themselves and, in effect, states created a “social shell” for their 
subjects (Kearns, 2006a).  
Similar issues arise with the collective action taken against epidemic disease. 
Plague regulations addressed with cordons sanitaires and quarantine, the threat from 
without (perceived in intercourse with foreign parts), and addressed with isolation and 
sanitation, the threat from within (understood as proceedingthought to proceed from 
disorderly or unregenerate persons and places). As Paul Slack (1988, page 433) 
remarks, “[a]ll this necessitated the growth of local administrative machines and an 
expansion of state power.” Thus at Milan in 1374, the regulations instructed the 
priests, “under pain of being burnt alive” to visit the sick and determine if there was 
plague, and it was further ordered that “each person who displays a swelling or 
tumour shall immediately leave the city, castle or town where he is and take to the 
open country […] until he either dies or recovers” (Horrox, 1994, page 203). In 
October 1579, the city of Seville responded with alarm to reports of plague in Lisbon 
since the immediate result was that folk from the infected city were fleeing to 
apparent safety in Seville (Cook and Cook, 2009). A plague commission was 
appointed and it adopted what by the sixteenth century were the more or less standard 
responses in southern Europe. It sent commissioners to the suspect districts (initially 
to Portugal and later to the countryside immediately around Seville) and it prevented 
traders from entering the city from places about which the city had received worrying 
report.  
The Italian regulations were the earliest and became the most elaborate in 
Europe and when, in 1578, the English government feared the imminent arrival of 
plague, the Privy Council instructed the City of London to consider adopting a 
version of the regulations used by Milan during the severe outbreak of 1576-7 and it 
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forwarded to the Lord Mayor copies of the forms and orders issued by Milan (Basing 
and Rhodes, 1997). In matters of plague policy London was some two centuries 
behind the innovations of the Italian cities of the mid fourteenth century. Even when it 
did adopt the measures of quarantine, its practice within London became itself a risk 
to public order because being visited upon the poor more often than upon the rich, it 
was felt as a piece of class-biased legislation (Newman, 2012). Nevertheless, London 
did take up the challenge of isolating the sick from the well and of ensuring that there 
were officials to administer the policy. The Orders of 1665 instructed, among other 
things, that each parish should have a number of Examiners who would visit the 
denizens of the sick and “command restraint of access, until it appear what the disease 
shall prove” and as incentive to take up this duty, they were warned that “if any fit 
Person so appointed, shall refuse to undertake the same, the said parties so refusing, to 
be committed to Prison until they shall conform themselves accordingly” (Anon, 
1665, n.p.). 
Again, we see that a social shell is arranged around the individual. Individuals 
could not secure these arrangements for themselves, however wealthy they might be. 
It required government to interrupt commerce, to prohibit the chaotic mixing of the 
sick with the well, and to force officials to remain and administer the epidemic crisis 
despite their self-interest in flight.  
Security, Territory, Population 
These epidemic and famine measures were central to Michel Foucault’s account of 
the development of biopower and in the lectures of 1978 on Security, Territory, 
Population (Foucault, 2007; Nally, 2011), he set out an account of the spatial 
strategies of the management of famine and disease under three different although 
overlapping regimes of sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. Sovereignty 
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understood space as realm or royal estate and treated the protection of state borders as 
the way to ensure the safety of the monarch’s rule. This regime managed individuals 
through juridical proscriptions, banning certain acts. Broadly speaking, Foucault saw 
the sovereign state as characteristic of the feudal period up to about the mid sixteenth 
century. Discipline, rather, conceptualized space as divisible into cells that could be 
regulated. Under discipline, people were imagined as a multiplicity of individuals 
who can each be trained to conform to an ideal (the norm as prescription). Foucault 
argued that the dissolution of feudalism, saw the emergence of a new territorial state 
with an administrative monarchy implementing disciplinary measures, and he 
suggested that this regime characterized Europe in the period from the mid-sixteenth 
to the later part of the eighteenth century. Finally, Foucault wrote about the 
emergence of state governmentality from the late eighteenth century. This regime 
projected space as a zone of circulation and as an environment or milieu. It 
understood individuals as self-reflexive subjects who might be induced to monitor 
their own conduct in line with the average (the norm as mean) and in this way enact 
the pursuit of those natural desires which, unfettered, conduce to the greatest social 
good. It also projected the population as an aggregate that could be regulated in its 
fertility and mortality, health and wealth, by state interventions to set the context in 
which individuals made decisions about work, family, and savings. 
With regard to famine, the primary distinction Foucault made was between the 
sovereign and administrative states on one hand and the commercial state of 
circulation on the other. While the first two policed borders rigorously, the last 
encouraged the free movement of commodities. For epidemics, again Foucault 
distinguished between constraints of the sovereign and administrative states and the 
permissions of the commercial state. Under the commercial state, the government 
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regulated population dynamics with poor law, tax, education, and other policies. But 
it also treated the urban environment as an object of intervention and to clean away 
the stagnant ordure that was thought to create miasmas and thus disease, it provided 
building codes, publicly owned water and sanitation, and controls on overcrowding in 
lodging houses. In a way, Foucault presented this focus on population and milieu as a 
new materialism that put into the shade, even if it did not entirely displace, the earlier 
strategies of territorial regulation. 
These are useful notes towards a study of the spatialities of European state 
strategies in the fields of famine and disease and the distinctions to which Foucault 
attended are suggestive. Foucault described the shift to governmentality, with its 
focus on population and milieu, as a shift towards an apparatus of security. Yet, we 
need to consider whether characterizing security in terms of biopolitics and 
governmentality adequately captures the distinctiveness of the modern challenge but 
before I approach this political question, I want first to examine a little further the 
historical account given by Foucault.  I want first to say a bit more about vitality and 
the arts of government in the period before governmentality, in the period for which 
Foucault used the language of safety rather than of security. For this early period there 
is no equivalent to the full-blown materialism of, say, Malthusian population policies 
and in this sense, Foucault gives us purchase on an important innovation when he 
identifies “population” as a new object of detailed policy intervention from, say, the 
mid-eighteenth century (Legg, 2005). But this is a matter of degree and not kind 
which is important because the elements of population and security we find in the 
earlier period were at that time articulated with the strategies of territoriality and 
sovereignty that Foucault sees being eclipsed by more fully developed population 
policies. The compatibility of population and territory raises different political, and I 
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would say geopolitical, questions than highlighted in Foucault’s treatment of the 
Security State. 
My second set of historical remarks concern Foucault’s treatment of 
geography and geopolitics. In an analysis of the way governmentality and biopolitics 
became thinkable and practicable, Foucault treats the state as the central agent, yet 
this agency must be understood set amidst the relations between and among states and 
empires. Diplomatic and military aspects of the health and famine strategies are 
shaded by the focus on states in isolation. There was something of a distributed 
agency (Quack, 2007) in the elaboration of regulations that involve inter-state 
conversations, implicit or explicit. The significance of geopolitics raises issues that I 
will examine in a concluding discussion of the AIDS pandemic and current 
biopolitical security. 
Vitality and the Arts of Government 
Foucault argued that states prioritized the safety of monarchical rule in the medieval 
and early-modern periods but that from the late-eighteenth century, this was 
supplemented and then overshadowed by a concern with security, delivered through 
related techniques of governmentality and biopolitics. There are some difficulties with 
this analysis from the perspectives both of vitality and security. Even though the 
aggregate and statistical analyses that Foucault highlighted as part of the materialism 
of governmentality were elaborated more fully in the nineteenth century, the question 
of vitality was not really absent from the early territorial or disciplinary famine and 
epidemic strategies. For example, Florence had Bills of Mortality from 1385 (Cipolla, 
1978). These records were generated from the weekly reports made by the city’s 
gravediggers to, respectively, the Grascia, a body charged with securing the 
provisioning of the city, the Guild of Physicians and Apothecaries who paid the 
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gravediggers, and, from 1607, also to the Health Magistracy of Florence who 
demanded that the gravediggers report “in writing all those who die in this city during 
the week, with specific reference to the quarters and the places where they die and the 
ailments they heard had caused the deaths” (Cipolla, 1978, page 454).  
The weekly publication of Bills of Mortality acted as a sort of morbid 
barometer warning residents when summers were turning so sickly that if means 
allowed they should consider country residence, and alerting the Health Magistracy to 
the local eruption of epidemic disease. When, in May 1603, the English heir apparent, 
James, saw that the weekly Bills showed the presence of plague in London, he was, as 
Mallin (1995, page 63) writes, caught between the now contradictory demands of 
“public legitimation and self-preservation,” but as weekly totals crept up he finally 
cancelled the coronation “owing to the growth of Plague and the fear that those 
coming to see our Coronation may spread it in the country.” Although the safety of 
the monarch is implicated in these health-reporting systems, it really does appear that 
the healthiness of places has a more general meaning and that it was understood as 
indicatedexpressed in values that described aggregates.  
On the other side, the question of security was at least implicit in these early 
famine and epidemic measures. Foucault’s argument is that the security provided by 
the Security State is given to the people and against outrageous misfortune. It is true 
that during the period of plague regulations, the Almighty was understood astaken to 
be the author of things properly known as plague and thus state responsibility might 
be limited, but not all epidemic deaths were plague, some, rather, were pestilence. As 
one British plague sermon of 1603 explained, a plague was to be considered a “blowe 
or stripe […] inflicted on mankind […] [b]y God, although mediately by spirit, or 
corruption, or both” (Clapham, 1603, n.p.). Against such divine judgment, alone were 
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prayer and repentance effective. But pestilence was the matter considered from a 
natural and not a spiritual point of view and God “hath created phisicall creatures for 
preventing and curing natural corruption, the materiall cause of our maladie and 
naturall sicknesse.” Thus after calling for prayer and fasting, “Magistrates and 
Ministers [were right to] have published naturall meanes in respect of naturall 
corruption.”3 
Because there weare understood to be natural causes as well as divine, then, 
temporal as well as spiritual redress was necessary. In one pamphlet on famine, the 
first sermon was given over to calling down curses upon corn hoarders but the second 
was addressed to “worthy Magistrates” exhorting them to diligence in seeking out 
hidden supplies and thus “doe their duties though the people do causelessly curse 
them” (Fitz-Geffry, 1649, page 19). Another treatise on plague and famine addressed 
“Magistrates [… who] have the power to cause divine directions to bee put in 
execution,” directions that will “settle orders for succouring poore people” (Gouge, 
1631, n.p.). Preaching a sermon to the British House of Commons in 1661, the year of 
the Restoration of Charles II, and in a summer when heavy rains appeared to have 
destroyed the annual harvest, Thomas Grenfield praised a loyal people and said that 
they deserved the attention of the government. He told the members of parliament that 
it was “now in your power to do them right, that have suffered wrong, and to feed and 
relieve these hungry ones, and the honour of the Action will be this, that thereby you 
will be followers of God” (Grenfield, 1661, n.p.). Notice that this was not a matter of 
private charity but of government obligation. 
                                                 
3 Ironically Clapham’s strong sense of predestination meant that he was heard as 
speaking of Plague only as a spiritual judgment with his fatalism considered 
disruptive to the implementation of plague regulations and, during the plague of 1603, 
he was imprisoned, occasioning the explanation offered in this Epistle (Walsham, 
2004). 
 13 
Field Code Changed
The plague and famine regulations, then, to some extent engaged with 
population aggregates and, moreover, impliedy a claim by people for state protection 
against natural calamity. These are features of what Foucault described as the nexus 
of biopolitics and governmentality and that he suggested were largely absent from 
state arts of sovereignty and discipline. I want now to follow this nexus into the 
geopolitics of this early period and supplement Foucault’s spatial perspective with a 
more explicit geography. 
Geography and Geopolitics 
While space was important in Foucault’s analysis, geography unfortunately was not. 
By concentrating on the state, Foucault produced suggestive typologies of the 
apparatuses of government (dispositifs) and he illustrated these distinctions with 
European examples. There is an implicit transition model here with each state 
emphasizing law, discipline and then governmentality for more or less similar 
reasons, and experiencing these shifts in focus either earlier or later than other states. 
But there was a historical geography and a geopolitics to the elaboration of state 
apparatuses with both relevant for thinking about the relations between security and 
vitality. The historical geography of the public health innovations during the Age of 
Plagues is well known (Kearns, 1989). In Europe, the Black Death of 1347-53 took 
perhaps one-third of the population (Kelly, 2005). What is striking about the response 
to this catastrophe is that measures adopted by Italian states after this first epidemic 
were still being debated and only lately adopted by northern European cities in the 
late-sixteenth century.  
The adoption of measures of protection in Italy was not only a model for its 
neighbours, first in southern and then in northern Europe, but also a protection for 
them, a buffer between northern Europe and the disease corridor that was the Silk 
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Road. For much of the sixteenth century, Venice and other Italian ports were the 
interface with trade that came overland to the eastern Mediterranean and then, in the 
main, across the Mediterranean to the warehouses of the Italian merchants. The 
relations between an original plague reservoir probably in central Africa, the 
establishment of a reservoir among the rodents of central Asia from the fourteenth 
century and its periodic transmission to Europe, about once a decade from the mid-
fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, were shaped not only by patterns of human 
movement but also by political geography.  
For the first European plague epidemics, the so-called Justinianic plagues of 
the early sixth century, Sarris (2002) suggests that the “crucial prerequisite” was the 
“geopolitical context” of military alliances and “close economic contact” between 
Ethiopia and Byzantium (Sarris, 2002, page 172). In like manner the connections 
between central Asia and Europe were overlain by the dynamics of several empires. 
In the mid-thirteenth century the Mongol Empire stretched from northern China 
across to eastern Europe. In parts of the Empire, nomadic ways were given up for 
agriculture, towns, and trade. This facilitated the communication of goods and 
pathogens along the so-called Silk Road. However, the new territoriality contributed 
to the quartering of the Empire after 1260 and of the four khanates, the two most 
sedentary were themselves then subject to further internal division (Morgan, 2009). 
From 1335 the dissolution of the Ilkhanate, centred on Persia, produced decades of 
warfare and conflict that not only produced more than a dozen new territories but 
threw armies and people across the western end of the old Mongol Empire at the very 
time that the plague stepped again into Europe.  
The fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries also saw the Ottoman Empire 
extend itself by continual warfare into the Anatolian and Balkan lands of the 
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Byzantine Empire. The wars by which were yielded Serbia and Bulgaria in the 
fourteenth century, Bosnia, Albania, Herzegovina and Montenegro in the fifteenth, 
and in the sixteenth, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Hungary, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia, not only themselves disrupted civil administration 
throughout much of the lands that were the interface between central Asia and 
Europe, but also installed across this vast space a cellular series of rentier regimes that 
never established regulatory regimes equal to those that Foucault described as 
supervening the waning feudal polities of western Europe. For the Ottoman Empire of 
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries, White (2010) describes a set of plague 
practices that on occasion separated the sick from the healthy but did not accept the 
quarantine system of the Italian cities, and probably for reasons that were also 
geopolitical in nature for the interruption of communication within the Empire was 
looked upon as divisive and antisocial (Shefer-Mossensohn, 2009). Only in response 
to the later plagues of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth century was quarantine 
adopted within the realm of the Ottoman Empire (Panzac, 1985). The acceptability of 
quarantine within Europe may perhaps have owed something at least to the ready 
identification of international traders, travelers or migrants as a threat foreign and 
external; a further implication of the differences between the early modern systems of 
empires on one hand and competitive states on the other (Jones, 1981). 
Rather than an autochthonous development of states, the regulation of famine 
and epidemics was always essentially international. Food security might even on 
occasion be a distinct goal of foreign policy. In a study of conflict along the mutual 
borders of the Russian and Ottoman empires, LeDonne (2006) suggests proposes that 
the attempt to displace Ottoman control of the Black Sea required the division of 
Poland so that, in getting the wheatfields of the Ukraine, the Russian Empire might 
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provision its army for battles against the Ottomans. Although not generally a cause of 
war, the international trade in corn was ever a sensitive matter in medieval and early 
modern times. In 1394,A royal dispensation was required in 1394 tlefto give 
merchants the right to freelyfree to export corn and in this case it was understoodbut 
as a temporary right and as excluding the export of corn to England’s enemies (Gras, 
1915, page 136). More generally between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries the 
export of corn was only tolerated when supply was plentiful and prices low. The 
international dimension of the trade was evident also in the regulations concerning 
domestic sale. In the City of London, according toby fourteenth-century regulations, 
non-citizens were not to “sell corn by sample, nor might they sell it to other strangers” 
(Gras 1915, page 65).  
The English government sought good relations with those European merchants 
most dominant in the corn trade so that in bad years itthey might rely upon good will 
cultivated during goodbetter. In the face ofFacing dearth, the commerce in grain could 
be as much a matter of morality as economy. In 1389 English merchants were allowed 
to transgress a ban on exports since grain was so scarce in the Baltic that the great 
exporting centre of Danzig was pleading for supply (Gras 1915, page 116). In 1640 
one Dutch trader was given an exceptional license to export English corn because, 
“often, in times of scarcity in England [he had] brought over hither a supply for his 
Majesty’s subjects” (Gras, 1915, page 196, quoting the statute). In the extremity of 
the worst famine (1315-17) of the Middle Ages, the English king, Edward II “wrote to 
both the king of France and the duke of Brittany requesting that merchants of 
Newcastle-on-Tyne be allowed to buy grain in their lands and ship it home” (Sharp, 
2012, page 12). During a famine of 1437-9, Henry VI “wrote to the Master of the 
Teutonic Order [which controlled some of the ports in the Baltic] with a request that 
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English merchants be allowed to buy 10 to 20 shiploads of grain to meet English 
needs” (Sharp, 2012ibid, page 18). 
Health measures too had their diplomatic side. In 1655 the government of 
Scotland proclaimed that it had “pleased the Lord to visit our Brethren and Neighbors 
of the United Provinces with the Pestilence” but “notwithstanding the said Visitation, 
the Trade and Commerce with those ports, and from them, is not at all lessened” so it 
ordered that no ship from that country would be given warrant to land “unless the 
Skipper bring Certificate from what place he came, specifying, whether the same 
were infected or not” and if that place of origin be announced as infected, then, a 
quarantine of forty days would intervene and if free of infection, then, twenty days 
(Scotland, Privy Council, 1655). These bills of health were perhaps first demanded in 
1626 by the port of Marseille  (Edelman, 1963). This required that the authorities of 
the suspect place be trusted to cooperate in issuing honest reports about the local state 
of health. In the eighteenth century Britain placed consuls in many foreign ports and 
relied only upon its own officials alone to issue bills of health to ships leaving for 
England (Booker, 2007). In similar fashion, in 1830, for example, Brazil informed 
foreign powers that “wishing to prevent […] certain captains of merchant vessels 
belonging to foreign nations […] not causing the manifests, passports and bills of 
health, to be duly certified by the Brazilian consuls, has thought fit to determine that 
[…] no merchant vessel shall be admitted to entry at the custom houses of this 
empire, unless provided with the document” (Anon, 1830, page 8). 
In 1838 the sultan of the Ottomans asked Austria for assistance in establishing 
quarantine stations throughout the Ottoman Empire (Harrison, 2006). In 1851, and in 
recognition of the greater health security produced for the Mediterranean by the 
cooperation of the Ottoman Empire, twelve nations met in Paris to discuss 
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harmonizing quarantine regulations throughout the Mediterranean. Although this first 
International Sanitary Conference achieved little (Harrison, 2006), it did underline the 
evidently international nature of sanitary regulations. Contributing to the difficulties 
in 1851 were arguments about the suitability of quarantine for the shock disease of the 
mid-nineteenth century, cholera. The British representatives insisted that cholera was 
not carried from place to place but was generated out of local conditions, 
miasmatically.  
The diplomacy involved in the quarantine system is perhaps nowhere more 
evident than in the unraveling of the system under the pressure of the new British 
doctrine. In December 1881 the Egyptian International Quarantine Boards began to 
impose quarantine upon all ships seeking entry at the southern end of the Suez Canal 
(Watts, 2006). There were reports of cholera from this port of Aden and yet, 
instructed to act on the principle that cholera was not contagious, the British Political 
Resident at Aden gave clean bills of health to all ships regardless of the presence 
aboard of cases of cholera, or of cholera reported from Bombay, the principal 
originating port for the ships. At Bombay itself, no steps were taken to investigate 
ships since the British saw cholera as endemic to the region and tied to its 
environment. The British port medical officer of Bombay did not even have a boat 
suitable for visiting and inspecting ships leaving the city (Watts, 2006). Seeking to set 
quarantine aside, the British officials affected horror that their bills of health were not 
accepted by the Ottoman officials and in 1882 occupied Egypt to allowso that ships to 
passcould go directly from India through the Suez Canal, uninterrupted by quarantine 
of any kind. 
The elaboration of health and famine policies during the periods of 
sovereignty and discipline, then, need to be understood viewed within the framework 
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of a system of states and not as directed by the evolution of state forms in isolation. 
Much the same is true of our current moment so that, rather than the Security State, 
we must attend to a system of states in a network, overdetermined, as I will argue, by 
the recurring negotiation of the inequalities of global capitalism. The state practices 
that are generally associated with the field of security continue to prioritize those 
aspects of territoriality and discipline that Foucault identified as part of the sovereign 
and the regulatory state and that, paradoxically, he saw as marginalized by the 
biopolitics and governmentality of what he called the Security State. 
The Geopolitics of Life 
Taking up Dean’s (1994) characterization of Foucault’s work as developing critical 
and effective histories, we might look backwards through the telescope and ask if the 
distinction between safety and security suggests productive strategies for engaging the 
causes of present discontents. Foucault sketched a transition from a world of safety to 
a world of security as “plague, death, and war” were eclipsed by a new set of 
anxieties about “everyday dangers” (Foucault, 2008, page 66). For Foucault, this is 
the form of security with which the Security State concerns itself. There was an 
interesting continuity in Foucault’s thought in this area. His experience of living in 
Sweden in 1955-8, gave Foucault “a grim vision of a future in which, in 50 or 100 
years time, everyone would be ‘happy, rich and ascepticized’” and “he never 
displayed any great affection for the country, which he regarded as too ‘medicalized’” 
(Macey, 2004, page 50). The same theme is evident in Foucault’s (2008, page 66) 
description of liberalism as a system where “individuals or the community have the 
least exposure to danger.” Featuring prominently in the lecture series, The Birth of 
Biopolitics, this version of liberalism was, claims Senellart (2008, page 329), the 
focus of Foucault’s “sole incursion into the field of contemporary history throughout 
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his teaching.” Foucault’s argument was that the counterpart to economic risk-taking 
in a free market economy was liberalism’s “famous disciplinary techniques for taking 
charge of the behavior of individuals” (Foucault, 2008, page 67). In this sense, liberal 
governmentality promotes freedom but only at the expense of “liberogenic” 
regulation (ibid, page 69). For Foucault, this was how a “crisis of the apparatus of 
governmentality” was “currently experienced, lived, practiced, and formulated” (ibid, 
page 70).  
 The political issue that is highlighted by these formulations is the question of 
personal liberty, the sense of living in a time when there is a permanent crisis under 
the sign of the claim that there is already too much government while there is also 
deepening regulation, protecting people against proliferating danger. Certainly some 
people, and Foucault (2008, page 75) cited a conservative art critic, Bernard 
Berenson, affected to fear the interventionist state more than they feared nuclear war, 
but even for the 1970s, it seems limited to argue that security was primarily an issue 
that arose as part offrom state regulation of individual behaviour.  
While “state-phobia” (Foucault, 2008, page 76) is an interesting matter, the 
threat of nuclear war and the structural violence of poverty seem more urgent causes 
of vital insecurity, and each was understood seen as a security issue at the time and 
they profoundly shaped systems of government in, respectively, rich and poor 
countries. Food security was conceptualized in terms of national self-sufficiency in 
poor countries (Biswas and Biswas, 1975) and for many rich countries nuclear 
strategy was understood as a problem of ensuring national safety in face of nuclear 
proliferation (Wilcox, 1972). The distribution of well-being in India after 
independence (1947) was profoundly shaped, in the first place, by a system of land 
reform (Besley and Burgess, 2000) and then by the so-called Green Revolution 
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(Frankel, 1971). The first saw some redistribution of land towards the rural poor yet 
without increasingdid not raise more food supply for the cities, while the second 
produced higher food transfers out of rural India but concentrated agrarian land 
ownership once again. These profound shifts in the economic rights of the majority of 
the Indian population were each justified as part of a search for food self-sufficiency. 
In the United States, the imperatives of a Nuclear Security State were claimed in 
support of the most extreme extension of presidential powers in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Wills, 2010) while in foreign policy the threat of a nuclear Soviet regime was offered 
as the reason why liberation movements that might be sympathetic to communism 
were intolerable in third world countries (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). For India, 
rural folk eating the food they grew rather than sending it to the market, and for the 
United States, an existential threat posed by a nuclear Soviet Union, were each seen 
as matters of vital security that dictated important aspects of governance. In other 
words, there does seem to be continuity from an early-modern problematic of 
government that engaged the apocalypse of war, disease, and famine. 
 In one sense, Foucault acknowledged this in The Birth of Biopoltiics but in a 
way that severed the connection between territoriality and sovereignty on one side, 
and vitality on the other. Foucault (2008, page 6) suggested that modern European 
sates were created when the “horizon” of government shifted from the ambition of 
“total and global empire” to the cultivation and defence of a national realm. The 
mutual destructionappalling mortality of the Thirty Years War encouraged the mutual 
recognition of limited interference in the affairs of other states with the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648) and a focus upon balancing powers in Europe, “the calculation of 
European equilibrium” (ibid, page 60), through adjusting frontiers to prevent the 
emergence of a hegemon that was yet Metternich’s ambition at the Congress of 
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Vienna in 1815. It was also in the context of the European balance of powers that 
Foucault offered one of his few discussions of colonialism. The novel contribution of 
Britain during the nineteenth century was, according to Foucault, that it sought to 
balance the parallelogram of European forces by acting as “economic mediator 
between Europe and the world market” (ibid, page 60). The zero-sum game of the 
European mercantilist imaginary was now suspended in favouret aside for of an 
expansionary vision of aa growing global market.  
With this new period of the Security State, then, Foucault comprehended the 
regulation of vitality within states as the choreography of individual behaviors, 
elevating and managing everyday dangers. The relations between states were now 
about minimizing the risk of all-out war within Europe and this effort involved 
forming European states that could balance against the risk of Empire, and that could 
grow in force through colonial rather than European appropriations. Yet the horsemen 
of the Apocalypse are with us yet and they are felt to impose imperatives upon states 
in ways that even todaycontinue to direct the priorities of government, and these 
imperatives continually turn geopolitical. Empire weaves together biopolitics and 
geopolitics, with respect both to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Elbe, 2005; Ingram, 2007) 
and to the so-called Global War on Terror (Butler, 2004; Kearns, 2013). 
Political Economy and Empire 
Colvin (2011) states a truth universally acknowledged: “HIV/AIDS has always been 
one of the most thoroughly global of diseases.” AIDS was first reported in 1981 
(Centers for Disease Control, 1981), an international definition was adopted in 1986 
(World Health Organization, 1986), and within a decade of the first reports, 163 
countries had reported cases of AIDS (Mann, 1992). This is a pandemic of 
connectedness, for some “the first epidemic of globalization” (Barnett and Whiteside 
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2002, page 2). The United States shows in microcosm a rather general feature of the 
epidemic. Within a few years, the geography of the disease reflected the 
connectedness of places rather than the route taken by the epidemic (Gould 1993). 
The intense interconnectedness of the world means that, even in the case of a disease 
spread largely by the most intimate of behaviours, the isolation required for effective 
quarantine is an option for only a handful of places. The disease is both symptom and 
consequence of circulation, and policies to address it must recognize this global 
interdependence. In 1999 the US Ambassador to the United Nations, the late Richard 
Holbrooke, pressed the UN Security Council to recognize AIDS as a threat to 
international security, a theme repeated in 2000 by Al Gore in a speech to the Council 
(Prins, 2004; Elbe, 2006). 
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 Population 
(millions) 
People 
living with 
HIV 
(millions) 
% Needing ART 
who receive it at 
public expense 
% Needing ART 
who receive it at 
international 
expense 
% HIV infected 
people receiving 
ART at public 
expense 
South 
Africa 
51.8 5.60 58.0 8.0 26.9 
Nigeria 170.9 3.40 7.8 23.2 3.2 
India 1210.2 2.39 7.1 35.9 3.7 
Brazil 194.0 0.49 77.1 0.9 47.2 
Thailand 65.9 0.49 60.5 10.5 39.5 
Haiti 10.4 0.12 0.5 57.5 0.3 
 
Table 1. HIV and ART treatment, 20114 
 
 With treatment, many AIDS deaths may be averted. For 2011, UNAIDS 
(2012) estimated that there were 34 million people infected with HIV, with 2.5 
million new infections that year. It estimated also that there were 14.8 million with 
CD4 counts below 350, and thus in need of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART), without 
which they might expect to die within two years.5 Of these, 8 million were currently 
receiving it. Table 1 shows the dimensions of the issue for a few countries. Of these 
                                                 
4 Data from UNAIDS, http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/, supplemented with 
material from Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
http://www.cdc.gov/globalaids/Global-HIV-AIDS-at-CDC/countries/ 
5 There is now a strong recommendation that ART treatment be started when CD4 
counts drop below 500, which would expand the numbers requiring treatment: Panel 
on Antiretroviral Guidelines for Adults and Adolescents (2013) Guidelines for the use 
of antiretroviral agents in HIV-1-infected adults and adolescents (Department of 
Health and Human Services, Washington DC). Available at 
http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/AdultandAdolescentGL.pdf 
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countries, Nigeria currently treats but 31% of those estimated to be in need of ART 
whereas in Brazil 78% of those in need of it are given ART. Some countries, such as 
Haiti, are very heavily dependent upon international aid for the treatment they offer. 
Needs are certain to grow since all those people currently HIV positive will see their 
CD4 counts fall, unless death supervene from another cause. Were they to need to 
treat with ART all those currently HIV positive, the increase in spending would be 
significant, for Haiti ruinous since at present only 0.3% of those infected with HIV 
are treated with ART at public expense. In this context, João Biehl (2004, page 107) 
reports on the Brazilian case as a transition from “political to biological rights.” In 
Brazil, the incidence of HIV is about one person in 400 whereas in South Africa it is 
one in nine and South Africa is a country with a right to health enshrined in the 
constitution (Hogerzeil et al, 2006) so that when we speak of therapeutic citizenship 
(Nguyen, 2005, 2010) in the context of ART therapies, we are implying a very 
different reorientation of the political economy of the state in the case of South Africa 
than for Brazil.  
There are currently nine countries where more than 10% of those in the 
principal working ages (15-49) are living with HIV/AIDS (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2013). Thus, in Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, and Malawi, at the very least, an economically 
significant part of the workforce can only remain active if ART therapy is available. 
The management of the economy, then, rests upon organizing a therapeutic 
citizenship. In a dangerous way, the workforce is rented from a combination of 
international aid and the global pharmaceutical industry. In these countries, life and 
economy are at the mercy of international agreements around the pricing of medicines 
(Flynn, 2011; Grover et al, 2012) and the provision of aid (Masellis and Gunn, 2002). 
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Therapeutic citizenship, then, a set of rights that confer life, is only to be realized 
within an international context. 
 As David Nally has demonstrated (2011), the same argument is readily made 
for the biopolitics of food security; the right to life is conditional upon the relations of 
international political economy with its defence of property rights that extract rent for 
subsistence at molecular and territorial scales. Nally also draws attention to an aspect 
of Foucault’s biopolitical argument that is helpful for understanding the form of 
governance that regulates life in this area but which needs to be considered outside 
the dialectic of liberogenic processes and state-phobic attitudes if we are to develop it 
in ways that are politically useful for addressing present discontents. Foucault (1978) 
contrasted the classical age, where the sovereign could defend itself by taking the life 
of subjects, a “right to take life or let live” (page 136), with a modern governmentality 
in which there is “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (page 
138). This murderous power is no longer exercised “in the name of a sovereign who 
must be defended” but, rather, “on behalf of the existence of everyone” (ibid, page 
137). Taking the side of an aggregate population, “genocide is indeed the dream of 
modern powers” (ibid, page 137). Foucault suggested two ways that the dispensability 
of lives to save life might be legitimated using population arguments. In the first, a 
“people” is expelled from the “population” because it is understood held to have cast 
itself adrift by failing to anchor itself properly through property relations, failing to 
abide by the disciplines of the market, “try[ing] to elude the apparatus by which the 
population exists, is preserved, subsists, and subsists at an optimal level” (Foucault, 
2007, page 44). The second technique retains the inadequates within the population 
but treats them as sub-norm, below average and thus justifying intervention “to bring 
the unfavorable in line with the more favorable” (ibid, page 63).  
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 Yet, the reference to sub-norms and to a people outside a population, does not 
seem adequate to the sheer violence of disallowing life to the point of death, or of 
dreaming genocide as a form of governance. Because they take liberty and the 
subjectivaiton of individuals as their primary focus, the lectures on the Security State 
in Security, Territory, Population and in The Birth of Biopolitics rarely touch the 
theme of collective violence that is so prominent in the earlier first volume of the 
History of Sexuality. From this earlier treatment, Judith Butler (2004) has developed 
her own politically salient reading of the Global War on Terror as resting upon the 
hegemon denying for itself, but visiting upon its victims an intense “precarity” of life. 
A division is made between lives that count and those deaths that do not even need to 
be counted (Butler 2009). Making this division rests upon abrogating extraordinary 
powers to the executive. These powers are not so much liberogenic as anti-liberal and 
they are justified with respect to notions of security that are certainly not about the 
dangers of the everyday. Naomi Klein (2007) notes that it is precisely the exceptional 
nature of the projected crises that allows the adoption of such “shock” measures. 
 There are three principal contexts in which this callous disqualification of 
lives occurs: state bankruptcy, war, and colonialism. Each of these has a necessarily 
geopolitical dimension. National bankruptcy is always imposed from outside at the 
behest of foreign investors, states, or banks, who seek extraordinary measures to 
realize assets in repayment of toxic debt. These extraordinary measures produce 
patterns of exclusion and desperation that deny subsistence to many and fuel divisions 
that often have murderous consequence, as Uvin (1998) shows for Rwanda.  
With the end of the Cold War, the executive presumption based on nuclear 
fears required recasting, and thus in this ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990) the 
US presidency crafted a new set of security priorities that equally required lack of 
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accountability at home and projected unbridled force abroad. This seeming contempt 
for people living in other countries raises questions about the international relations 
between states, life and law. To render this geopolitics more evident, iIt may beis 
helpful to think of the Global War on Terror as an exercise in what Giorgio Agamben 
terms the exception (Gregory, 2004). In one interview of 2004 (Sacco, 2004), 
Agamben identified his account of the exception as using the ‘same genealogical and 
paradigmatic method practiced by Foucault’ but noting two lacunae in Foucault, ‘law 
and theology. It seemed natural for me to address my two latest studies in this 
direction’ (quoted in Snoek 2010, page 46).6 For Agamben, at its limit, sSovereignty 
is exercised without the normal legal forms, which are suspended. Agamben was 
talking about state sovereignty but the argument is also suggestive if given a colonial 
reading. Because, in declaring a Global War on Terror, the US presumes to suspend 
international law and agreements in pursuit of terrorists, we might I think claim that 
this is therecognise here a form of imperial sovereignty, the right to assert the global 
exception (Kearns, 2009). The same suspension is part of the emergency powers that 
seem to be the normal form of colonial rule (Hussain, 2003; Kearns, 2006b). These 
geographies of exception suspend the protections for life, asserted in international 
agreements on human rights or in the formal structures of liberal governance, colonial 
or not. The forms in which security implicates life, and the vital geographies stalked 
by the horsemen of the Apocalypse are ever resolutely geopolitical.  
                                                 
6 The two works Agamben was referring to have been published in English as The 
Time that Remains (2005a) and State of Exception (2005b). The first takes up 
Theology and the second, Law.  
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